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Abstract
In a multi-domains application environment, where
distributed multiple organizations interoperate with each
other, the local access control policies should correspond-
ingly be integrated in order to allow users of one orga-
nization to interact with other domains. One of the key
challenges of integrating policies is conflict detection and
resolution while preserving policy consistency. This paper
addresses several types of potential conflicts and consis-
tency properties with a systematic and rigorous approach.
In the approach, graph theory, network flow technology
and colored Petri nets are applied for specifying and
verifying a secure interoperation design. The component-
based integration of policies is applicable for both static
and dynamic multi-domains environments.
Keywords: secure interoperation, conflict resolution,
colored Petri nets, dynamic environment.
I. Introduction
Security policies are one of the most fundamental ele-
ments of computer security. In order to address the require-
ment of multi-domains interoperation, current security
policy design trends to the composition of components and
interactions between them. Consequently, in a component-
based specification and verification of a policy, the com-
position of local policies must consistently preserve some
properties of security policies. A rigorous and systematic
way to predict and assure such critical properties is crucial.
Composition of the local access control policies into a
global coherent security policy is a challenging problem
since many kinds of violations may occur during the
composition. In a RBAC policy, the potential conflicts
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appearing in an interoperation can be considered in the
following aspects:
1) role inheritance violation: in an interoperation policy,
the cross domain hierarchy relationship may intro-
duce a path in the interoperation domain enabling
a role A which has no inheritance relation with
B in their local domain to assume the permission
of B. The cyclic inheritance addressed in some
literature [1], [2], [3] belongs to the role inheritance
violation;
2) cardinality for roles, users and shared resources: they
are numerical restrictions on access control entity
assignments. Concretely, a roler with cardinality
r i implies that the number of users simultaneously
assigned withr cannot exceedr i ; a user u with
cardinalityu j implies that the number of roles simul-
taneously assigned tou cannot exceedu j ; a resource
o with cardinality om implies that the number of
users simultaneously accessing too cannot exceed
om;
3) separation of duty (SoD): in a local policy or in an
interoperation policy design, some conflicting roles
are not permitted to be assigned to a same user; some
roles with conflicting privileges are not permitted to
be activated simultaneously in a session; and some
conflicting users cannot be assigned with the same
role;
4) resource sharing: in an interoperation policy, local
resources are permitted to be shared by the collab-
orated domains. Because of resource cardinality re-
striction, the case of “circular waiting” for resources
may occur and result in system deadlock.
Besides conflicts resolution, the following problems
should also be addressed in order to get an effici nt and
consistent interoperation policy.
1) user-role assignment and optimization: in each ses-
sion, how to assign users to their qualified roles is an
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issue to be handled well in order to make the policy
more efficient. This optimization problem is to find a
user-role assignment with as many (user, role) pairs
as possible without cardinality violation;
2) dynamic environments: the interoperation policy de-
sign should permit the addition of new domains and
new users, deletion of domains from the collabora-
tion, and evolution of local domain’s policies.
3) consistency verification: the interoperation policy
should be consistent with the constituent policies.
This was expressed in [2], [3] by the autonomy
and security principles. Autonomy principle means,
if an access is permitted in the local policy, it
must also be permitted in the global policy; security
principle means, if an access is not permitted in the
local policy, it must not be permitted under secure
interoperation.
As described above, conflict resolution and consistency
verification are the main concerns for dealing with se-
cure interoperation in multi-domains environments. The
problems have been partly addressed in literature. [3]
resolves the role assignment violation and SoD violation
with a 0-1 integer programming (IP) approach, where the
objective is to maximize the inter-domain role accesses.
The violation constraints are modeled as the constraints of
the IP problem. The domain of integer programming pro-
vides some approximation algorithms such as Lagrangian
relaxation, tabu search and simulated annealing for solving
IP problem. But the approach is not applicable for a real
large policy system because the constraints are too many.
For example, in the illustrative example shown in the
literature, there are almost 1500 constraints for a small
system. Another difficulty for the IP approach is that, the
selection of the weight for the objective function is itself
an open research issue. When the interoperation occurs in
a dynamic environment, where addition of new domains
and removal of domains of collaboration are permitted, the
IP approach meets even more challenges to be rephrased.
In [4], the authors apply a modified Petri net, called a
Conflict Petri Net, to analyze the interoperation and evalu-
ate the possibility of security violations. They detect con-
flicts concerning separation of duty, temporal constraints,
and cardinality constraints. With these conflict Petri nets
and the defined firing rules, although some violation can
be detected, the resolution of conflicts is hard and policy
consistency verification is even more challenging.
The paper [5] presents a goal-oriented and model-driven
approach to analyze the security features of local policies
and a guideline for integrating them to fulfill the security
goals of the global policy. The proposed analysis procedure
leads to the discovery of three classes of security interop-
erability conflicts: different definitions of security, different
implementation mechanisms and conflicting authorization
policies, which helps to determine whether or not the
domain policies should be used together. How to resolve
such conflicts is not the point of the paper.
The paper [6] handles resource sharing in a mediator-
free scheme. In the scheme, every local domain creates and
maintains cross-domain policies; any security violation to
any domain can be detected by the domain itself and each
domain finding a security violation raises a negotiation
among domains to remove the violation; each domain is
responsible for making the access decisions when entities
from other domains access to its own resources. Since the
paper focuses on resource sharing, conflict detection and
resolution are not considered in detail.
The paper [7] proposes a security violation detection
method for RBAC based interoperation. This method
reduces complexity by decreasing the amount of roles
involved in detection.
There is much earlier related work [1], [2], [8], [9]
concerning cyclic inheritance, conflict resolution and SoD
violation resolution [9], [10]. Policy consistency is also
considered in [11]. A brief review of these papers can be
found in [3].
As analyzed above, up to date approaches contain some
shortages when considering the above secure interopera-
tion problem. Handling policy composition in rigorous and
systematic way is yet a challlenge.
Taking the viewpoint of policy system design, this
paper addresses a component-based systematic approach
for specifying and verifying an interoperation policy by
integrating the constituent policies. The approach and
the main contribution are roughly outlined as follows:
first, the role inheritance hierarchy is modeled with role
inheritance graphs. Some crossing arcs between these
inheritance graphs are applied for specifying the interop-
eration. When a role inheritance violation (RIV) occurs, a
depth-first search algorithm is provided for resolving the
RIV problem; then, role-privilege assignment and user-role
assignment are specified with a colored Petri net (CPN);
based on this CPN model, cardinality constraints are
specified with the number of tokens in the corresponding
places, and control places are applied for solving the SoD
constraints; the deadlock-free resource sharing problem is
handled by applying place merging operators; in order
to get an efficient access control ability, how to activate
a session is converted into the max-flow problem which
can be solved by existing algorithms. The final model for
interoperation is a colored Petri net and an access decision
corresponds to a reachable marking in the colored Petri net
specification. The CPN model applied in this paper is quite
simple and equivalent to ordinary Petri nets. Hence, the
reachability analysis techniques adopted for ordinary Petri
nets are also applicable to our CPN model. During the
process of integration, the previously mentioned conflicts
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and principles are considered for specification, resolution
and verification. Conflict resolution and consistency can be
guaranteed in this approach.
The motivation of applying Petri nets for the speci-
fication and verification of interoperation policy is that
Petri nets are well-known for their graphical and analyt-
ical capabilities for the specification and verification of
concurrent and distributed systems. They have two main
features particularly convenient for our methodology of
interoperation security policy design:
1) Petri net representations are analytical and flexible.
Analysis and logical reasoning can be performed on
their representations and on their properties. They
are compatible with a compositional approach via
operators for compositions, refinements and reduc-
tions, and their functional purposes and characteris-
tics are accurately and logically reflected.
2) Many Petri net-based techniques are available for
verification, including reachability analysis or mathe-
matical programming, as well as for characterization
and transformations (see [12], [13] for a review).
There are also abundant results concerning property
preserving operators.
Motivated by these advantages, much work about ap-
plying Petri net for the policy design has appeared in the
literature. In [14], a colored Petri net (CPN) based frame-
work is presented for verifying the consistency of RBAC
policies. In [15], CPN is used to specify a real industrial
example. Based on the CPN model, the Design/CPN
tool is applied for the implementation of automatic code
generation. [16] defines task based access control as a
dynamic workflow and then specifies the workflow with
Petri nets. [17], [18] model Chinese wall policy and
Strict Integrity Policy, respectively, with CPN and apply
coverability graph for the verification. [19] uses CPN for
the specification of mandatory access control policies and
occurrence graph is applied for verification. [20] applies
Predicate/Transition net for the modeling and analysis of
software security system architectures.
We have to mention that the above Petri net based
work considers policy design in a single local domain
environment. [4] tried to handle conflict problems in an
interoperation environment, but the approach is neither
complete nor rigorous as analyzed above. The approach
presented in this paper is, to the best of our knowledge,
among the first efforts on systematic integration and anal-
ysis of security policies for both static and dynamic multi-
domains environments in the literature.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II introduces some related terminology about Petri
nets and a discussion of our model; Section III is about
the detailed policy specification and conflict resolution;
the verification technique is presented in Section IV and
Section V illustrates the policy design technology with an
example; some conclusive remarks are given in Section VI.
II. Basic Terminology about Petri Nets
This section briefly introduces some basic terminologies
about Petri nets and colored Petri nets applied in this paper.
More information can be found in [21], [22].
Definition 1 (Petri nets): A Petri net(N,M0) is a net
N = (P,T, F,W) with an initial marking M0 where P is a
finite set of places; T is a finite set of transitions such that
P∩T = ∅, and P∪T , ∅ ; F ⊆ (P×T)∪ (T×P) is the flow
relation; W is a weight function such that W(x, y) ∈ N+ if
(x, y) ∈ F and W(x, y) = 0 if (x, y) < F; M0 is a function
M : P → N such that M(p) represents the number of
tokens in place p∈ P.
The idea of colored Petri net (CPN) is to introduce the
notion of token types. Tokens are differentiated by colors,
which may be arbitrary data values. Each place has an
associated type determining the kind of data that the place
may contain. The precise definition can be found in [22].
Definition 2 (Colored Petri nets (CPN)): A colored
Petri net is a tuple CPN= (Σ,P,T,A,V,C,G,E, I ) , where
1) Σ is a finite set of non-empty types, also called color
sets. The set of types determines the data values and
the operations and functions that can be used in the
arc expressions, guards and initialisation.
2) P is a finite set of places.
3) T is a finite set of transitions.
4) A is a finite set of arcs such that: P∩ T = P∩ A =
T ∩ A = ∅
5) V is a node function V: A 7→ (P× T) ∪ (T × P).
6) C is a color mapping C: P 7→ Σ. The color function
C maps each place p to a type C(p), which means
that each token on p must have a data value that
belongs to C(p).
7) G is a guard function. It is defined from T into
expressions such that∀ ∈ T : Type(G(t)) = Boolean
and Type(Var(G(t)) ⊆ Σ. For any transition t∈ T,
the guard of t is a boolean expression, where all
variables have types that belong toΣ.
8) E is an arc expression function. It is defined from A
into expressions such that:∀a ∈ A : Type(E(a)) =
C(p)MS and Type(Var(E(a)) ⊆ Σ, where p is the
place of V(a). For any arc a∈ A, the type of E(a)
is the multiset C(p)MS, which means that E(a) must
evaluate to multisets over the type of the adjacent
place p. Moreover all variables in an arc expression
E(a) have a type inΣ.
9) I is an initialization function. It is defined from P into
closed expressions such that:∀p ∈ P : Type(I (p)) =
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C(p)MS. I maps each place p∈ P into a closed
expression that must be of type of C(p)MS.
In this paper, colored Petri nets are much simpler than
those of Definition 2, since we do not consider guard
functions for transitions. Hence, the firing rule for a CPN
is similar to that for an ordinary Petri net, except that
the markings and weights are represented as multiple
dimensional vectors. Our CPN is just a folding of several
ordinary Petri nets with the same net structure. Hence,
our CPN is equivalent to an ordinary Petri net and the
reachablity analysis techniques for ordinary Petri nets
are also applicable for our CPN model. The meaning of
equivalence is defined below.
Definition 3 (equivalent nets):[23] Two nets(N1,M10)
and (N2,M20) are said to be equivalent if there exists
a 1-1 mappingρ between the markings of these two
nets satisfying: 1) M20 = ρ(M10) and 2) any two mark-
ings M11,M12 ∈ R(N1,M10) satisfy M11[N1, σ1〉M12 iff
ρ(M11), ρ(M12) ∈ R(N2,M20) and ρ(M11)[N2, ∗〉ρ(M12) in
(N2,M20)
Usually, colors in the CPN are used to distinguish
different types of data. In this paper, besides some
ordinary tokens, there are three types of color sets:
Users = {u1,u2, · · · ,ui}, Roles = {r1, r2, · · · , r j}, and
O = {o1,o2, · · · ,om} for distinguishing different users, roles
and objects, respectively.
III. Specification of Secure Interoperation
Policy
In this section, a formal specification methodology of
secure interoperation is addressed. Each of the potential
conflicts is considered for specification and resolution in
an independent subsection.
A. Specification of domain-integration and conflict
resolution
In this paper, we use notationGD to denote the role
inheritance graph in a domainD. We borrow a definition
from [6] for defining our role inheritance graph inD, where
the similar graph is called domain policy graph with much
more complex notations.
Definition 4 (role inheritance graph): Given a policy
defined on a domain D, a role inheritance graph is a graph
GD = (VD,AD), such that each node v in VD corresponds
to a role in the domain D, and an arc(u, v) ∈ AD iff role
u is immediately senior to role v in the policy.
Definition 5 (interoperation graph): Let GD1 =
(VD1,AD1) and GD2 = (VD2,AD2) be two role inheritance
u
D1
v
r
TD1(u)
IH(u)
D2
Fig. 1: Shortest path treeTD(u).
graphs in domains D1 and D2, respectively. An
interoperation graph GD = (VD,AD) in the interoperation
domain D= D1∗D2 is created by integrating GD1 and GD1
as follows: VD = VD1 ∪ VD2, AD = AD1 ∪ AD2 ∪ A12 ∪ A21,
A12 and A21 are sets of arcs from VD1 to VD2 and from
VD2 to VD1 built in the following way: an arc(u, v) ∈ A12
(resp., A21) iff u ∈ VD1 (resp., VD2) is immediately senior
to v ∈ VD2 (resp., VD1) in the interoperation policy of D.
In this construction process, role inheritance violation may
occur.
Definition 6 (role inheritance violation (RIV)): RIV
occurs when a user u in domain D is allowed to access
a local role v even though u is not directly assigned to
v or to any of the roles that are senior to v in the role
hierarchy of domain D.
Role inheritance violation occurs when a useru in D1
that cannot accessv in D1 may access a roler in D2 which
is senior to rolev in the interoperation domainD = D1∗D2
(Fig. 1). It is more general than cyclic inheritance violation
addressed in [1], [2], [3]. When roleu cannot inherit the
permissions of rolev, u may be either junior tov (the
inducement of cyclic inheritance violation) or independent
of v in their local domain.
Property 1 If an interoperation graph GD has directed
cycles, then a role inheritance violation occurs.
Proof. If there exists a directed cycle inGD, then any two
roles in the cycle can mutually inherit the privilege of each
other, which obviously results in RIV.@
The well-known breadth first search algorithm [24] can
be applied to generate a shortest path tree rooted at node
s in graphGD. The output of the algorithm is denoted as
TD(s) = (VTD (s),ATD (s)). Assume that the shortest path tree
rooted at nodeu in GD1 is TD1(u) = (VTD1 (u),ATD1 (u)) and
in GD is TD(u) = (VTD (u),ATD (u)). Let IH (u) = (VTD (u) −
VTD1 (u)) ∩ VD1, then IH (u) is the set of nodes which may
cause role inheritance violation for nodeu. In order to
avoid the role inheritance violation for nodeu, a set of
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arcsA′ ⊂ A12∪ A21 should be deleted fromGD.
Property 2 (Fig. 1) Let us consider a node u∈ VD1 in
graph GD1 = (VD1,AD1), and let D= D1 ∗ D2. The role
inheritance violation occurs for u iff IH (u) = (VTD(u) −
VTD1 (u))∩VD1 , ∅. Furthermore, for each node v∈ IH (u),
there exists a node r in VD2 such that r is senior to v in
the interoperation policy.
Proof. By definition of IH (u), the nodes inIH (u) do not
belong to the path rooted at nodeu in D1, which implies
that they are either senior tou or independent ofu in
the local domain policy. RIV occurs foru iff there exists a
nodev in IH (u) such thatu can access tov, i.e. IH (u) , ∅.
Furthermore,u will accessv by inheriting the permissions
of some noder in D2 which is senior tov. @
For each arc (u, v) ∈ A12 ∪ A21, let us assign to the arc
(u, v) a weighteuv = |VTDi (v)| which is the number of nodes
in the shortest path treeTDi (v), wherev ∈ VDi , i = 1 or 2.
A weight with a higher value implies more inheritance
privileges by crossing domain.
For any w ∈ IH (u), if u < VTD (w), let us then create
an arc (w,u) and denote the set of all these arcs asAu =
∪w∈IH (u)(w,u). Obviously, the graph (VD,AD − A′) has no
role inheritance violation for nodeu iff (VD,AD ∪Au−A′)
has no role inheritance violation for nodeu.
Let AU = ∪u∈VD Au. Based on the graphG = (VD,AD ∪
AU), the Resolve RIV algorithm (Fig. 2) is used to break
cycles inG in order to avoid role inheritance violation in
the interoperation policy. Once there is a directed cycle in
the graphG, RIV will exist. In order to break a cycle, one
and only one arc needs to be deleted. In order to maximize
the resource accessibility and preserve the autonomy of
local policies, we always delete a lower weighted arc in
A12∪ A21.
The time complexity of the depth first search algorithm
is O(m+ n), wherem and n are the number of arcs and
nodes in the graphG. For each nodeu in VDi , we need to
run a breadth first search algorithm [24] with time com-
plexity O(m+ n) in order to computeIH (u),TD(u),TDi (u)
andevu. The total complexity for resolving the inheritance
violation is O(mn+ n2).
It is known that the RIV problem is equivalent to the
feedback set problem which is generally NP-hard [2]. In
the remaining part of this subsection, the RIV problem in
two interoperating domains is considered. More technical
details about this problem can be found in [25].
Definition 7 (RIV Problem in two domains): For a
graph G= (VD,AD ∪ AU) created as above, is there a set
of arcs A′ ⊂ A12∪A21 such that: 1) G= (VD,AD∪AU −A′)
has no directed cycles; and 2) the sum of the weights for
these arcs in A′ is minimum.
!"#$%&!'()*%!*#+),&!+-./)(%&0
1!23$4%!+!.)+$&!! 5!6"#$%&# &'7 !!!8!%0+9!,/3%+(3!,9,-#*
:!;#.(3!
<!'/)!#+,&!3/"#%( "#=!+3"!2>6(7 !!"/
?!!!!!;#.(3
@!!!!!!!!!430+)A!+--!3/"#*!(3!.)+$&!
B!!!!!!!!!0+)A!3/"#!( 8C%&#!(3(%(+-!3/"#D
E!!!!!!!!!$)#"6(7!5!F!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!8C(%!&+*!3/!$)#"#,#**/)D
G!!!!!!!!!3#H%I51!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8C3#H%!(*!+!,/43%#)D
J!!!!!!!/)"#)!6(7I!5(
1F!!!!!!!K2LM!5C(D
11!!!!!!!N&(-#!K2LM!!"/
1:!!!!!!!!!!!!;#.(3
1<!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!*#-#,%!+!3/"#!)!(3!K2LM
1?!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!('!3/"#!(!(*!(3,("#3%!%/!+3!(3+"0(**(;-#!+),!6)=!*7!!!!!!!8C+!,9,-#!(*!'/43"D
1@!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!;#.(3!!
1B!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! *#-#,%!%N/!+),*!6+)=!,)7=!) 5!1=!:!*+%(*'(#*!%&+%=!+1=!,: "#1=!+:=!,1 "#:=!
1E ,)=!+)% !K2LM!*+%(*'9(3.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1G /)"#) 6*7 !/)"#)!6+17 !/)"#)!6,17 !/)"#)!6+:7 !/)"#)!6,:7 !/)"#)!6)7!
1J!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!/)
:F!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! /)"#) 6*7 /)"#) 6+:7 !/)"#) 6,:7 !/)"#)!6+17 !/)"#)!6,17 !/)"#)!6)7
:1!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !('!-+.,. O!-+/,/ C! 5!6"#=!&# P C6+1=!,17D7D
::!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! #-*#!C! 5!6"#=!&# P C6+:= ,:7D7D
:<!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!K2LM!5!K2LM!P C*=!Q=!+)=!Q=!,)=!Q=!)D
:?!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#3"!
:@!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#-*#!('!3/"#!)%(*!(3,("#3%!%/!+3!+"0(**(;-#!+),!6)=!*7!%&#3
:B!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!;#.(3!
:E!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!0+)A!3/"#!*R
:G!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$)#"6*7I5)R
:J!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3#H%!5!3#H%!S!1
<F!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!/)"#)!6*7I5!3#H%R
<1!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!+""!3/"#!*%%/!K2LMR
<:!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#3"
<<!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#-*#
<?!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"#-#%#!3/"#!)!')/0!K2LM
<@!!!!!!!!!!!!#3"!
<B!!!!!#3"
<E!#3"
<G!/4%$4%!.)+$&!! !!!!!!8T!"/#*!3/%!,/3%+(3!,9,-#*
T)##"9!+-./)(%&0
1!(3$4%! 5!!6"#$%&# &' P &1: &:17
:!/)"#)!%&#!+),*!(3!&1: &:1 (3!3/3U"#,)#+*(3.!/)"#)!%/!N#(.&%!+*!-1 -:! !Q=! -,
<!'/)!)%51!%/!,=!"/
?!!!!!!!!!('%!SC-)D!"/#*!3/%!&+V#!+!"()#,%#"!,9,-#!%&#3!!I5! SC-)D
@!/4%$4%!!
Fig. 2: Resolve RIV algorithm.
The RIV in two interoperation domains is a special
case of the feedback arc set problem. In the following,
we will convert the RIV problem into a minimum weight
vertex cover problem in a bipartite graph and solve it with
polynomial-time complexity algorithms. Before that, let
us recall the definition for the vertex cover problem and
consider a property which is applicable to the problem
conversion.
Definition 8 (Vertex cover problem): A vertex cover for
an undirected graph G= (V,E) is a subset S of its vertices
such that each edge has at least one endpoint in S . The
vertex cover problem is the optimization problem of finding
a smallest vertex cover in a given graph. The Weighted
Vertex Cover Problem is defined as follows: given a simple
graph G= (V,E) and a weight function w: V → R+ , find
a vertex cover of minimum total weight.
Property 3 (Fig. 3) In the graph G= (VD,AD∪AU) defined
above, if there exists a directed cycle C1 such that|C1 ∩
(A12 ∪ A21)| > 2, then there is an arc pair(ai ,b j) which
belong to both C1 and another directed cycle C2 in G.
Furthermore, C2 ∩ (A12∪ A21) = {ai ,b j}.
6
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Fig. 3: An inheritance cycle.
Proof. SupposeC1 ∩ (A12 ∪ A21) = {(ui , vi), (v j ,u j)}, i, j =
1,2, ..., k. Let C1 = u1v1...v2u2...vkuk...u1. For the vertexu1,
if u2 ∈ IH (u1), thenC2 = u1v1...v2u2...u1 contains an arc
pair (ai ,b j), whereai = (u1, v1) and b j = (v2,u2) and the
property is proved. Ifu2 < IH (u1), then let us consideru2
and repeat the above steps. Since there exists inheritance
violation in G, there must exist aui ∈ IH (ui−1). By the
above steps, an arc pair ((ui−1, vi−1)(vi ,ui)) belongs to both
cycles and satisfiesC2 ∩ (A12 ∪ A21) = {(ui−1, vi−1)(vi ,ui)}.
@
Since cyclic inheritance should be avoided in each local
policy design before policy composition for interoperation,
we may assume that there is no directed cycle in each local
inheritance graph and we have the following property.
Property 4 Suppose ui ,u j belong to domain D1, vi , v j
belong to domain D2 and D= D1∗D2. For two arcs ai ,b j ,
where ai = (ui , vi),b j = (v j ,u j) in G = (VD,AD∪AU), there
exists a directed cycle C satisfying that C∩ (A12∪ A21) =
{ai ,b j} iff u j ∈ IH (ui) (or ui < IH (u j)) and vj < IH (vi) (or
vi ∈ IH (v j).
Proof. If there exists a directed cycleC satisfyingC∩(A12∪
A21) = {ai ,b j}, then there exists a path inD1 connecting
u j to ui and henceu j ∈ IH (ui) (or ui < IH (u j)), and a path
in D2 connectingvi to v j and hencev j < IH (vi) (or vi ∈
IH (v j). On the other hand, ifu j ∈ IH (ui) (or ui < IH (u j))
andv j < IH (vi) (or vi ∈ IH (v j), then there exists a path in
D1 connectingu j to ui and a path inD2 connectingvi to
v j . These two paths together with arcsai and b j form a
directed cycleC in G. @
Based on the above properties, for each directed cycle
C, we can find a special arc pair (ai ,b j) in C, which is
the intersection of a cycle (that may or may not beC)
and the arc set (A12 ∪ A21). Hence, we can construct a
bipartite graph as follows: letB = (U ∪V,E) be a bipartite
graph with two independent vertex setsU andV. E is the
set of edges inB. Let G = (VD,AD ∪ AU) be defined as
above. Each arcai ∈ A12 in the graphG corresponds to
a vertexai in U with weight w(ai) and each arcb j ∈ A21
corresponds to a vertexb j in V with weight w(b j). An
edge (ai ,b j) ∈ E is in B iff there is a directed cycleC
satisfying thatC∩ (A12∪A21) = {ai ,b j} in the graphG. In
other words, an edge (ai ,b j) ∈ E is in B iff u j ∈ IH (ui) (or
ui < IH (u j)) and v j < IH (vi) (or vi ∈ IH (v j) in G, where
ai = (ui , vi) andb j = (v j ,u j) in G.
Property 5 Let the graph G= (VD,AD ∪ AU) and the
bipartite graph B be defined as above. Then, resolving RIV
in G is equivalent to finding the minimum weight vertex
cover in B.
Proof. By construction of the bipartite graphB, each
edge in B corresponds to at least one directed cycle in
G. Resolving RIV inG amounts to delete some arcs in
(A12∪A21) with minimum sum of weights. A vertex cover
in B corresponds to a set of arcs which cover all directed
cycles in G. Hence, the minimum weight vertex cover
corresponds to the minimum sum of weighted arcs that
should be deleted fromG in order to resolve RIV.@
In the following, our focus is on solving the minimum
vertex cover problem in the bipartite graphB. Based on
graph theory, we show a 1-1 correspondence between
minimum vertex cover and minimum cut in a bipartite
graph. In order to state this property, we need to introduce
a few definitions and constructions.
Based on the undirected bipartite graphB = (U ∪V,E),
let us define ~E as a directed version ofE, and let us
construct a directed networkN = (U ∪ V ∪ {s, t},A),
where s is the source vertex,t is the sink vertex,A =
{(s,ai), (b j , t)} ∪ ~E, ai ∈ U,b j ∈ V; an arc (ai ,b j) ∈ ~E is in
N iff an edge (ai ,b j) ∈ E is in B for i, j = 1,2,3, .... The
capacity for each arc inN is defined as follows:C(s,ai) =
w(ai),C(b j , t) = w(b j),C(ai ,b j) = ∞, i, j = 1,2,3, .....
Definition 9 (s− t cut): A cut of a directed graph G=
(V,A) is a partition of the vertices set V into two parts, S
and S̄ = V − S . Each cut defines a set of arcs consisting
of those arcs that have one endpoint in S and another
endpoint inS̄ . An s− t cut is defined with respect to two
distinguished vertices s and t, and is a cut(S, S̄) satisfying
the property that s∈ S and t∈ S̄ .
Definition 10 (Capacity of a s− t cut): The capacity
C(S, S̄) of an s-t cut(S, S̄) is defined as the sum of the
capacities of the arcs from S tōS in the cut. That is,
C(S, S̄) =
∑
(u,v)∈(S,S̄) C(u, v).
The network flow and the cut have the following
relation which is useful for our purpose.
Max-flow min-cut theorem [26]: The maximum value of
the flow from a source vertexs to a sink vertext in a
capacitated network equals the minimum capacity among
all s− t cuts.
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Fig. 4: A s− t cut and the vertex cover for graphB.
The following two properties give a 1-1 correspondence
betweens− t cut and vertex cover. Consequently, based on
the minimums− t cut, a minimum weighted vertex cover
can be found.
Property 6 (Fig. 4) Let B= (U ∪V,E) and N= (U ∪V ∪
{s, t},A) be defined as above. Let(S, S̄) be a s− t cut in N
satisfying(S, S̄)∩ ~E = ∅ and let cov= (U\S)∪(V∩S). Then
cov is a vertex cover of B and the weight w(cov) = C(S, S̄),
where C(S, S̄) is the capacity of the cut(S, S̄) .
Proof. Let us first prove thatcov is a vertex cover ofB:
sinceU\S ⊂ cov, all arcs associated withU\S are covered
by cov. Other arcs that are associated withU∩S must also
be associated withV ∩ S because thes− t cut does not
include the arcs in~E. Hence all arcs associated withU
are covered bycov andcov is a vertex cover ofB. In the
following, we provew(cov) = C(S, S̄): (a)∀u ∈ U\S, (s,u)
is a cut edge andC(s,u) = w(u); (b) ∀u ∈ V ∩S, (u, t) is a
cut edge andC(u, t) = w(u). There are no other cut edges
and hencew(cov) = C(S, S̄).@
Fig. 8 gives an illustrative example. For clarity, the ab-
breviated vertices and arcs are not mentioned below. It has
a s− t cut (S, S̄), whereS = {s,a1,a2,b1,b2,bi} which are
above the block broken line and̄S = {ai ,ak,b j} which are
under the block broken line. Thencov= {ai ,ak,b1,b2,bi}
is a vertex cover ofB andw(cov) = w(ai)+w(ak)+w(b1)+
w(b2) + w(bi) = C(S, S̄).
Property 7 Let B= (U ∪V,E) and N= (U ∪V ∪ {s, t},A)
be defined as above. Then(S, S̄) is a minimum s− t cut
in N iff cov= (U \ S) ∪ (V ∩ S) is a minimum weighted
vertex cover in B.
Proof. We just need to prove 1) the minimums − t
cut satisfies (S, S̄) ∩ ~E = ∅ and hence it corresponds
to a vertex cover based on Property 6; and 2) for any
vertex covercov = U′ ∪ V′, where U′ ⊆ U,V′ ⊆ V
in a bipartite graphB = (U ∪ V,E), it corresponds to a
s− t cut (S, S̄) satisfying (S, S̄) ∩ ~E = ∅. The following
are the proof details: 1) suppose (S, S̄) ∩ ~E , ∅. Based
on max-flow min-cut theorem [26], the max-flow for the
networkN is infinite since the capacity of each arc in~E is
infinite. This contradicts the fact that the max-flow cannot
exceed
∑
i w(ai) based on the construction ofN. 2) Let
S = {s} ∪U/U′ ∪ V′ and S̄ = U′ ∪ V/V′ ∪ {t}. Then (S, S̄)
is a s− t cut. In the following, we prove (S, S̄)∩ ~E = ∅. Let
us consider an arc (ai ,b j) ∈ (S, S̄) ∩ ~E. Then ai ∈ U/U′
and b j ∈ V/V′ and the arc (ai ,b j) cannot be covered by
cov= U′∪V′, which contradicts the assumption thatcov is
a vertex cover ofB. From both 1) and 2), it is clear that the
weight ofcov is equal to the capacity of the corresponding
cut based on the proof of Property 6. Hence, (S, S̄) is a
minimum s− t cut in N iff cov= (U \ S) ∪ (V ∩ S) is the
minimum weighted vertex cover inB. @
Based on Properties 6 and 7, finding a minimum weight
vertex cover forB is finding a minimums − t cut in
network N. Hence, resolving RIV is converted to solving
a minimums− t cut problem.
It is well-known that any max-flow algorithm can be
applied for finding minimum cuts in a network since
they are dual problems [26]. Some max-flow algorithms
with polynomial-time complexity can be found in [24].
Currently, the time complexity for the fastest max-flow
algorithm is somewhat higher thanO(mn). For example,
the Goldberg-Tarjan algorithm [27] has a time complexity
O(mnlog(n2/m)) and excess scaling algorithm has a com-
plexity O(n2m0.5) [24], wherem is the number of arcs and
n is the number of vertices in the networkN.
In this section, we assume that there are weights for
each arc inA12∪A21 in order to give a more general solu-
tion. When all the arc weights are equal to 1, the problem
is much easier to solve. In this case, the minimum vertex
cover in a bipartite graph can be solved by applying max-
matching algorithms [28] with time complexityO(mn),
wherem is the number of edges andn is the number of
vertices in the bipartite graphB.
To summarize, the steps for designing a secure inter-
operation policy based on two domainsD1 and D2 are as
follows:
1) Formulate role inheritance graph for each local pol-
icy GDi (we assume the local policies are secure)
and for each vertexv ∈ VDi , find the shortest path
treeTDi (v), i = 1,2 rooted atv based on breadth first
search algorithm [24];
2) Based on the cross mapping between the two do-
mainsD1 andD2, formulate the policy interoperation
graph GD and for each vertexv ∈ VD in GD,
find the shortest path treeTD(v) rooted at vertexv
based on breadth first search algorithm [24], and let
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IH (v) = VTD(v) − VTDi (v), i = 1,2;
3) Based on Property 3 and Property 4, find all arc
pairs (ai ,bi) (cyclic inheritance detection algorithm
(Fig. 2) is applied) and construct the weighted bi-
partite graphB = (U ∪ V,E);
4) Based onB = (U ∪V,E), construct the networkN =
({s, t} ∪ U ∪ V,A); by applying max flow algorithm
for networkN, find a minimums− t cut (S, S̄); then
cov = (U \ S) ∪ (V ∩ S) is the minimum weighted
vertex cover ofB.
5) Delete those arcs incov from the interoperation
graphGD, and a policy without inheritance violation
is obtained.
More generally, when there are more than two in-
teroperation domains, the method consists in adding the
considered domains iteratively. Hence, the approach is
applicable for flexible and large-scale systems.
B. Specification of role-privilege assignment and
inheritance
In a policy, each role is assigned with some privileges
of accessing some objects (we use object to denote both
data and other resources indifferently). In this paper, we
use colored Petri net to specify the privilege assignment.
Fig. 5(a) is the Petri net model for a single role-privilege
assignment, where placel i is the entry place of roler i ,
if it is initially marked, meaning that roler i is available.
When transitionei is fired, placer i gets a new token,
meaning that roler i is ready to be activated. The resource
place O represents the objects, where different kinds of
objects are represented with different kinds of colored
tokens. The number for each kind of objecto has an upper
boundbo, meaning that the objecto can be shared by at
mostbo subjects simultaneously. In the corresponding CPN
specification, the number for each color of tokenso has
an upper boundbo. The weightdi for the arc (O, ti) is a
vector of colors, representing the objects to which rolei is
requested to access. For example, let us suppose that roler i
has a privilege of accessing 3 patients’ records datared in
an hospital domain and 2 bank records datadblue in a bank
domain. Thendi ⊆ {3dred,2dblue}. If place ai is marked, it
means that the requested objects are being processed by
role r i . Once roler i finished accessing the resource, the
exit transitionxi is fired, it releases all requested objects
and the exit placepi is marked. Firing transitionfi can
release the roler i .
When role r i inherits the permissions of roler j , we
compose the two CPN modelsRi andRj by adding an arc
from transition fi to placel j . For example, in Fig. 5(b),r i
inherits the permissions ofr j and rk, for the specification
of inheritance, two arcs (fi , l j) and (fi , lk) are added to
compose the three role-privilege Petri net models. The
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Fig. 5: The role-privilege assignment and role inheritance.
resultant model is shown in Fig. 5(c).
More generally, for the interoperation policy design, the
roles in the system are composed by refining each role
node in the inheritance-conflict-free interoperation graph
(created in Section III-A) with its corresponding Petri net
model. After that, the resource placeO in each role-
privilege Petri net model will be merged into a single
resource place in the resultant system. For example, the
specification of the role-privilege assignment and resource
sharing for the interoperation graph in Fig. 5(b) is shown
in Fig. 5(c). More technical details will be introduced in
Section III-D.
C. Specification of cardinality, SoD and violation
resolution
In an access control system, each user may have many
qualified roles but usually not all qualified roles can be
assigned to this user simultaneously due to cardinality
constraints.
Definition 11 (cardinality violation): Each user ui can
assign with at most usi roles, each role rj can be assigned
to at most ujt users and each resource object O can be
accessed by at most k users simultaneously. If any one
of these constraints is not satisfied, a cardinality violation
occurs in the interoperation policy.
In order to solve the cardinality violation, the following
Petri net based specification is applied: based on the user-
role mapping, let us suppose that userui is assigned with
role r j . In the corresponding Petri net modelRj for the role-
privilege assignment specification, we add an input place
ui to the entry transitionej (Fig. 6(a)), such that placeui
is initially marked withusi tokens, representing that user
ui can be assigned withusi roles. Similarly, we initially
assignu jt tokens in the entry placel j for representing that
role r j can be assigned tou jt users.
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Fig. 6: Modeling SoD.
When two (resp., more) usersui and u j are assigned
with an identical roler i , there are two (resp., more) entry
transitionseii and ei j which are associated to the entry
place l i and the role placer i . The user placesui and u j
are associated to the two (resp., more) entry transitions
respectively as input places (Fig. 6(c)).
According to the specification of resource cardinality,
we usek identical colored tokens to represent that the
corresponding resource object can be shared by at mostk
users simultaneously. For example, if there are four types
of objectsa,b, c, andd in the policy, and if the cardinality
for these objects are 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively, then the
resource place is initially marked with 1 token of colora,
2 tokens of colorb, 3 tokens of colorc and 4 tokens of
color d.
For user-role assignment, the following separation of
duty may result in SoD violation.
Definition 12 (Separation of Duty (SoD)): Static sepa-
ration of duty means that two conflicting roles cannot
be assigned to a single user simultaneously. Dynamic
separation of duty means that two roles with conflict-
ing permissions cannot be activated simultaneously in a
session. A user-based separation of duty means that two
conflicting users cannot access a same role at the same
session.
The Petri net model in Fig. 6 can be applied for the
specification of the SoD violation resolution. In Fig. 6(a),
a single userui cannot be assigned to two conflicting roles
r i and r j . In the Petri net specification, we use a control
place r i j initially marked with a normal token associated
to the assignment transitionsei andej , respectively. Even
if user ui , roles r i and r j are available, only one ofei or
ej can be fired and hence only one of the two roles can
be assigned to userui .
Fig. 6(b) is a specification of dynamic SoD resolution.
It is similar to Fig. 6(a). The difference is that the control
placer i j is associated to the activation transitionsti andt j .
Even if userui , roles r i and r j are available, only one of
ti or t j can be fired and hence only one of the two roles
with conflicting permissions can be activated in a session.
Finally, Fig. 6(c) is a specification of user-based SoD.
Let us suppose thatui andu j are two conflicting users and
cannot be assigned to a same roler i . For the two entry
transitionseii and ei j , an additional control placeui j with
an initially marked normal token is created. Initially places
l i ,ui and u j are marked with many tokens based on their
respective cardinality. Even if the usersui ,u j and the role
r i are available, only one of transitionseii and ei j can be
fired and hence only one of the usersui and u j can be
assigned to roler i in a session.
The legend of the places and transitions are presented
in TABLE I.
TABLE I: Legend for Fig. 5 and Fig. 6
l i , l j , lk role places
r i , r j , rk roles with users assigned
ai ,a j ,ak state of processing objects
pi , p j , pk state of deactivating roles
ui ,u j ,uk user places
r i j ,ui j control places
O object place
ei ,ej ,ek,eii ,ei j user-role assignment
ti , t j , tk activate roles and access privileges
xi , x j , xk deactivate roles and release objects
fi , f j , fk release roles
The separation of duty problems can be generally ex-
tended and resolved as follows: if the number of conflicting
roles (resp., users, permissions) isk, then the control
place will be associated to the correspondingk assignment
or activation transitions. More generally, if there aren
conflicting roles (resp., users, permissions) andk of them
cannot be assigned or activated simultaneously, then the
control place with initially markedk ordinary tokens will
be associated to the correspondingn transitions.
D. Specification of resources sharing and deadlock
recovering
In the Petri net model created in the above steps, there
are some identical places, e.g., the user places. If a user
ui with cardinality k is qualified with rolesr i , r j and rk,
then there is a user placeui initially marked withk tokens
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that appears three times in the Petri net model. In order to
simplify the Petri net model and implement the cardinality
requirement, these identical places should be merged into
a single place.
For the specification of resources sharing, a similar
technique is applied. That is, the places representing the
resources should be merged into a single resource placeO.
After applying place merging, each role will be associated
with the resource placeO. This does not imply each role
can access all the objects inO. The privilegedi of each
role r i is assigned in the corresponding arc (O, ti) between
O and the accessing transitionti . Only when the requested
objectoi belongs todi and is available inO, ti can be fired
andoi is accessible. For specifying a cardinality constraint
of sharing an object, we use an upper bound for each
object. For example, if an objectoi can be shared by at
most ki users simultaneously, then there areki identical
colored tokens, say, red tokens, inO for representing the
object oi . When there is no cardinality constraint for the
objecto j , its upper bound should be large enough, saymn,
wherem is the number of users andn is the number of
roles. Hence, the initial marking of the resource placeO
is a vector of integers, each item representing the sharing
cardinality of the corresponding object. For a reachable
marking M in the Petri net model,M(O) is a vector of
integers and each item represents the number of remaining
objects which can be shared simultaneously.
Note that resources-sharing is a hard problem in many
systems design, e.g., in manufacturing system, because it
may result in deadlocks. In our interoperation policy de-
sign, the deadlock will not occur if there are no controlling
relations between the objects (resources) and consequently
the inducement “circular waiting” will not occur. When
there are some controlling relations between the objects,
e.g., accessing objectoi should preprocess objecto j , then
deadlock may occur. For example, in Fig. 7, there is a
single objectoi and a single objecto j in the resource
place O. Let us assume that a userui requestso j , and
before accessingo j , he should preprocess an objectoi ; at
the same time, a useru j requestsoi , but before accessingoi ,
he should preprocessthe objecto j . In this case, a “circular
waiting” may appear and there is a deadlock. For solving
deadlock problems, siphon-trap technology [29], [30] and
adding control places [31] are efficient methods. The
following is a methodology for detecting and removing
deadlocks by adding control places in a resource sharing
policy design.
Deadlock-free Design
Input: n Petri nets forn roles
Output: A compositional deadlock-free model for thesen
Petri nets
1) For each pair of Petri nets which have common
resource places, do place merging
oi
ui
oj
uj
oi
oi
oi
oj
oj
oj
O
Fig. 7: An example of deadlock for resource sharing.
2) For the compositional net, calculate the next reach-
able markingMR(k + 1) from the initial marking
M(0) by MR(k+ 1)T = M(k)T L∗VP.
If MR(k+ 1) = M f , output “There is no deadlock in
the two nets” and goto Step 5);
else find out the dead marking and record the dead
transitions and goto Step 3);
3) Add a control place for the dead transitions in this
compositional net;
4) Change the weighted place transitive matrix, and
check dead marking and dead transitions again
if there are also dead transitions, continue to add
control place until the net is deadlock-free;
else output “There is no deadlock in the two nets”
and goto Step 5);
5) For other pairs of Petri nets sharing resources, do
the same work as Step 1) to Step 4), until all the
compositional nets are deadlock-free.
6) Merge these n news nets together into a large com-
positional one by place merging, and a deadlock-free
model for the secure interoperation policy is gotten
In the above algorithm,MR(k + 1)T = M(k)T L∗VP is a
transformation of marking equation based on the place-
transitive matrixL∗VP [32], where MR(k + 1) is a vector
of nonnegative integer and is a reachable marking from
M(k), M f is a final marking in a role-privilege modelRi
such thatM f (pi) > 0. More technical details about how
to add control places for solving deadlocks can be found
in [31].
E. Optimization of user-role assignment
With the Petri net specification introduced in the previ-
ous subsections, a secure interoperation policy without role
inheritance violation, cardinality violation, SoD violation
nor system deadlock can be designed and an access request
can be handled properly. In order to make the policy
system more efficient, we now try to find an optimal user-
role assignment such that the system can permit as many
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Fig. 8: The network flow model for user-role assignment.
users as possible to safely access simultaneously.
In other words, we address in this section the following
problem: in a session, how to assign users to their qualified
roles with as many (user, roles) pairs as possible without
cardinality violation?
In order to express the problem more clearly, consider
the example shown in TABLE II. A possible user-role
assignment isu1 → r1,u2 → r2,u4 → r3,u5 → r4,u6 →
r5,u7 → r6,u8 → r7; for this assignment, there is no
cardinality violation. Butu3 and u9 have no roles and
roles r2, r6 and r7 have space for more users. Obviously,
it is not an optimal assignment. A good policy requires
as many users as possible to safely access the objects
simultaneously without any conflicts.
In order to obtain a user-role assignment such that a
maximum number of (user, roles) pairs can be obtained in
a session, we apply the following network flow model and
use a max-flow algorithm for the solution. Let us consider
the networkG = (V,A), whereV is the set of nodes and
A is the set of directed arcs. Each user and each role are
represented with a node inV, s is the source node andt is
the sink node in the network. There is an arc connecting
source nodes to each user nodeui and the capacity in
the arc (s,ui) is usi (cardinality of ui); there is an arc
connecting each role noder j to the sink nodet and the
capacity in the arc (r j , t) is u jt (cardinality of r j). There
is an arc with capacity 1 connecting userui to role r j iff
userui is qualified with roler j in the interoperation policy
(Fig. 8).
Based on the network model, the user-role assignment
problem is to solve the following max-flow problem:
Given G = (V,A) with
V = {s,ui , r j , t},A = {(s,ui), (ui , r j), (r j , t)}
where i = 1,2, · · · ,m, j = 1,2, · · · ,n.
Let
xi j = flow on arc (ui , r j);
xsi = flow on arc (s,ui);
x jt = flow on arc (r j , t);
usi = capacity of flow in arc (s,ui);
u jt = capacity of flow in arc (r j , t);
s= source node andt = sink node
Find a maximalf under the following constraints:

m∑
i=1
xsi = f
n∑
j=1
x jt = f
xsi −
n∑
j=1
xi j = 0,∀i
x jt −
m∑
i=1
xi j = 0,∀ j
0 6 xsi 6 usi
0 6 x jt 6 u jt
xi j ∈ {0,1}
(1)
The solution for the above max-flow problem is a
maximum user-role mapping such that there is a maximum
number of roles which can be assigned with users without
cardinality conflict. Note that the above integer program-
ming model is just a description of the max-flow problem,
and our focus is not to find an approximation algorithm
for solving the 0-1 integer programming problem. In fact,
our solution is based on the network model shown in
Fig. 8. For saving space, the max-flow algorithms will
not be introduced here and the interested reader can
refer to any textbook about network flow optimization or
programming. For instance, the Ford-Fulkerson max flow
algorithm, the capacity scaling algorithm and the preflow
push algorithm [24] are all applicable for solving this
problem.
With the technique introduced in this section, for a
given session, an optimal user-role assignment is obtained.
Based on an optimal max-flow solution, we can select
which roles must be activated by which users in order to
permit as many users as possible to safely access objects
simultaneously.
F. Specification of dynamic environment
The main characteristic of a dynamic environment of
interoperation policy design is to allow the addition of new
roles (resp., users, domains) in the collaborative system
and the removal of roles (resp., users, domains) from
collaboration, as well as sometimes the evolution of local
domains access policy.
Based on our approach, each role is designed indepen-
dently with a CPN, the privileges and users are specified as
tokens and assigned to their specific role based on this CPN
model. When a new role is added, its corresponding CPN
model is integrated into the existing system based on the
role inheritance hierarchy; when a role is removed from
collaboration, the corresponding subnet can be deleted
from the system. Both cases will not affect the remaining
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part of the system. Addition and removing of domains
can be handled similarly. Since privileges and users are
specified as tokens in the CPN, addition and removing of
users are processed inside a single subnet and will not
affect other parts of the system, either. When an evolution
for a local domain’s policy is necessary, the corresponding
subnet will be handled independently.
IV. Verification of the Interoperation Policy
Design
This section considers the verification of conflict and
policy consistency for the secure interoperation policy
design. State equations and reachability techniques are
simply introduced.
A. Conflict verification
Based on the technique introduced in Section III-A, for
an inheritance graphGD1, if role u is senior to rolev, then it
is also true in the interoperation graphGD since all the arcs
in AD1 remain inGD; if role u is not senior to rolev in the
local domainD1, it still is not senior in the interoperation
policy of D, since all those violation arcs are deleted in
the algorithm. HenceGD has no role inheritance violation,
and both the autonomy principle and security principle are
preserved.
For cardinality specification, the number of tokens in the
specific place can guarantee the concurrent firing times in
the Petri net model based on the firing rule.
As for SoD violation, which is introduced in Sec-
tion III-C, based on the Petri net firing rule, the single
token in the control place guarantees that the two violation
transitions cannot be fired simultaneously, hence obviously
the violation can be dealt properly. In the generalized
case, there may ben conflicting roles (resp., users and
permission) andk of them cannot be assigned or activated
simultaneously. Since the control place is initially marked
with k tokens and associated with thesen conflicting
transitions, at mostk of them can be fired simultaneously
and the SoD problem can be resolved.
B. Reachability verification
With the above steps, an interoperation policy is speci-
fied with a colored Petri net. The request-decision process
(ui ,d j) (user ui requests to access objectd j) amounts to
find a firing sequenceσ in the Petri net model such that
Mi [N, σ〉M j , whereMi(ui) > 0 and there exists a placep j
satisfyingM j(p j) > d j . The following is the analysis and
verification details for a specific request.
In a Petri net (N,M0), any reachable markingM satisfies
the state equation [21]. In other words, if the state equation
is not true, then the corresponding markingM is not
reachable. Hence we have the following property for an
interoperation Petri net model.
Property 8 For a specific request(ui ,d j) and all the
reachable markings Mi and Mj satisfying that Mi(ui) > 0
and Mj(p j) > d j in the interoperation model(N,M0), if
the state equation Mj = Mi + Vµ is not true, then the
requested resource is not accessible.
Proof. If the state equationM j = Mi +Vµ is not true, then
the markingM j is not reachable formMi . Correspondingly,
there is no path from placeui to placep j and hence user
ui cannot access objectd j in the interoperation policy.@
Property 9 For a specific request(ui ,d j), let us assume
that ui is qualified to the roles in the set Ri and the resource
d j is included in the privilege of role set Rj . If for any ri ∈
Ri and rj ∈ Rj , there does not exist a directed path from
r i to r j in the interoperation graph GD, then the requested
resource is not accessible.
Proof. If the requested resource is accessible, then there
exists a firing sequenceσ in the Petri net model such that
Mi [N, σ〉M j , whereMi(ui) > 0 and there exists a placep j
satisfyingM j(p j) > d j ; the firing sequenceσ is a transition
sequence including some transitions inr i ∈ Ri andr j ∈ Rj .
Therefore in the interoperation graph there exists a directed
path fromr i to r j , which leads to a contradiction.@
For a request (ui ,d j), if either Property 8 or Property 9
is true, then the request is not accessible. If none of the
properties is true, the following reachability tree technique
will be applied for verification.
A reachability tree is a tree rooted at the initial marking
M0, such that each node in the tree is a reachable marking
of the Petri net (N,M0). For two nodesMi and M j in the
tree, there is an arc fromMi to M j iff there is a transition
t satisfyingMi [N, t〉M j in the Petri net (N,M0).
Generally, the reachability tree may encounter the space
explosion problem. Fortunately, for our interoperation pol-
icy design, each role-privilege assignment Petri net is
bounded (the structure is simple, this is easy to verify).
After applying place-merging, based on the theoretical re-
sults shown in [33], the resultant Petri net is still bounded.
As a consequence, the corresponding reachability tree is
finite. Hence, for a request (ui ,d j), if there is a firing
sequenceσ in the Petri net model such thatMi [N, σ〉M j ,
where Mi(ui) > 0 and there exists a placep j satisfying
M j(p j) > d j , Mi and M j are reachable markings in the
Petri net model (N,M0), then the requested resource is
accessible, otherwise it is not accessible.
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V. Illustrative Example
The example in this section contains two domains, one
is office staff and another is medical staff. In the office staff
domain, there are five roles: office manager (r1), medical
representative (r2), secretary (r3), accounts payable (r4)
and purchasing (r5), where payable and purchasing have
a separation of duty constraints; and the medical staff
domain contains two roles, i.e., doctor (r6) and nurse (r7)
and they have separation of duty constraints. There are
9 users (denoted asui , i = 1,2, · · · ,8,9) in the system,
where usersu1 andu3 have a separation of duty constraint.
For simplicity, we suppose that the cardinality for all the
users is 2. That is, each user can have at most 2 roles in
a session. The access privileges for each role, the users’
possible assignment and role-cardinalities are shown in
TABLE II. There are four types of objects: the prescription
records, medicine information, financial information and
patients’ personal information ; we denote these objects as
a,b, c andd respectively. Suppose prescription record data
a can be shared by at most 2 users simultaneously, object
b can be simultaneously shared by 2 users, objectc can be
accessed by only one user and objectd cannot be shared
by two users.
The interoperation rule is as follows: in the office
domain, the secretary (r3) has access to medical domain by
inheriting the permissions of the doctor (r6); in the medical
domain, the doctor (r6) and the nurse (r7) have access to
the office domain by inheriting the permissions of the office
manager (r1) and the secretary (r3), respectively.
TABLE II: Constraint information for the example
roles privilege Possible users cardinality
Office manager (r1) d1 = {a,b} u1,u2 1
Medical-representative (r2) d2 = {a,b} u2,u3 2
Secretary (r3) d3 = {b, c} u1,u2,u4 1
Accounts payable (r4) d4 = {c} u5 1
Purchasing (r5) d5 = {c} u6 1
Doctor (r6) d6 = {a,b,d} u7,u9 2
Nurse (r7) d7 = {d} u7,u8 2
Step 1.Based on the senior-junior relation between
these roles, an inheritance graphGD for the interopera-
tion domain is illustrated in Fig. 9. After applying the
shortest path tree generating algorithm to the graphGD,
we get IH (r3) = {r1}, IH (r7) = {r6} and IH (r i) = ∅ for
i = 2,3,4,5,7. Sincer3 < VTD1 (r1) and r7 < VTD2 (r6), arcs
(r1, r3) and (r6, r7) are added to the graphGD (Fig. 9) to
create directed cycles. For the three cross domain arcs,
the weights aree(r6, r1) = 2,e(r7, r3) = 3 ande(r3, r6) = 1,
respectively. Then based on the Resolve RIV algorithm, the
arc (r3, r6) is deleted fromGD and an inheritance-conflict-
free graphG is obtained (Fig. 9).
r1
SoD
SoD
r2
r3
r4 r5
r6
r7
office
manager
medical
staff
Fig. 9: Generating conflict-free inheritance graph.
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2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
Fig. 10: The max-flow network model for user-role assign-
ment.
Step 2.For each roler i , the colored Petri net model
Ri for specifying the role-privilege assignment is created
(refer to Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 11),l i is initially marked with 1
or 2 tokens according to its cardinality shown in TABLE II.
Step 3.Based on the user-role assignment shown in TA-
BLE II and the inheritance-conflict-free graphG (Fig. 9),
the max-flow model (Fig. 10) is obtained as follows: if
useru is qualified with roler i which is senior tor j , then
there are arcs (u, r i) and (u, r j) in the network model.
Based on the pre-flow push algorithm [24], we get the
following user-role assignment such that the maximum
number of (user, role) pairs is available. In this example,
there are at most 10 users (including identical users) who
can be assigned with roles simultaneously based on the role
cardinality shown in TABLE II. All the optimal solutions
are shown in TABLE III, we select the first solution for
illustrating the user-role assignment specification in order
to get an efficient interoperation policy design.
Based on the system requirement, there are SoD con-
straints between usersu1 andu3, rolesr4 and r5 and roles
r6 andr7. Hence, the user-role assignment model (Fig. 11)
for composingR6 and R7 will have an additional control
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TABLE III: All the optimal user-role assignment
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7
u1 u2,u3 u4 u5 u6 u7,u9 u7,u8
u1 u2,u3 u2 u5 u6 u7,u9 u7,u8
u2 u2,u3 u1 u5 u6 u7,u9 u7,u8
u2 u2,u3 u4 u5 u6 u7,u9 u7,u8
d6
O={2a, 2b, c, d}
d2
d6
d2
r4 l4
d4t4 e4x4
u5
r5 l5d5 t5 e5x5
u6
d4 d4 d5 d5
d1
d3
d3
p1
p4 p5a4 a5
e23
d1
r6
l6
d6
u7
r7
l7
d7
d7
r67
d7
t6 t7
e67 e77
x6 x7
u9 u8
e78
e69
a7
p7
a6
p6
r3
l3
d3
t3
e3
x3
u4
a3
r2
l2
d2
u2 u3
u13
t2
e21
x2
a2
p2
r1
l1
d1
t1
e1
x1
u1
a1
p3
Fig. 11: The colored Petri net specification of the secure
interoperation policy.
placer67 and the CPN modelR2 has an additional control
placeu13 (Fig. 11). For this example, in order to simplify
the structure of the Petri net model, we do not add a
control place for composingR4 andR5 although there are
conflicting constraints between rolesr4 andr5. The reason
is that there are no common users which can be assigned
to both r4 and r5 based on the information shown in
TABLE-II. At last, all the role-privilege assignment models
Ri are composed by merging the identical places and the
resultant CPN modelN for the secure interoperation policy
specification is shown in Fig. 11.
The request (ui ,o j), meaning that userui requests to
access objecto j ∈ O = {2a,2b, c,d}, is processed as follow:
for a markingMi satisfying Mi(ui) > 0, if there exists a
firing sequenceσ and a placepi such thatMi [N, σ〉M, and
o j ∈ M(pi), then the decision for the request is “permit”,
otherwise, the decision is “reject”. For example, in Fig. 11,
suppose current state is “useru8 is accessingd7 = {d}
and useru1 is dealing withd1 = {a,b}”. Then the current
marking Mi satisfies thatMi(u8) = Mi(u1) = 0,Mi(a7) = d
and Mi(a1) = {a,b}. For a new request (u7,d), there exists
a firing sequenceσ = e77x7t7x7 such thatMi [N, σ〉M satis-
fies M(p7) = d. It means that the objectd is not accessible
in O (currently occupied by useru8 and transitiont7 is
not firable) until useru8 finishes its accessing request and
releases the objectd (firing transition x7), sinced cannot
be shared by two users simultaneously based on the policy
requirements. Another new request (u3,a) is immediately
permitted since there exists a firing sequenceσ = e23t2x2
such thatMi [N, σ〉M satisfying thatM(p2) = a.
VI. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper mainly considers the conflict resolution
problem for a secure interoperation policy design. The
contribution and the approach are briefly summarized as
follows: globally, the roles and their relations in the inter-
operation environment are modeled as a directed interop-
eration graph, based on which, role inheritance violations
are detected and resolved using a resolve RIV algorithm,
which selects to delete some inheritance relations with the
minimum inheritance weight. The resulting graphG does
not contain role inheritance violation anymore. Then, for
each roler i in domainD, its privileges are assigned based
on a colored Petri net modelRi . Cardinalities are specified
as numerical restrictions for the initially marked tokens in
the corresponding places inRi . Next, each roler i is refined
with its corresponding modelRi to the inheritance graph
G, and the separation duty constraints are considered by
adding control places after the refinement. The user-role
assignment problem is modeled as a max-flow problem
and solved by a mature max-flow algorithm, e.g, preflow
push algorithm [24], in order to give an optimal user-
role assignment for each session; at last, the resource
sharing problem is specified by resource place merging.
When deadlock occurs, the mature siphon-trap technology
and addition of control place technology can be applied.
Finally, based on the resulting Petri net model, handling a
request is to search for a firing sequence in the bounded
Petri net model. State equation technology and reachability
tree technology can be applied for the decision-making and
verification.
Since multi-domains environments are going to change
frequently, policies integration may face to much more
complex conflicts, that may be for example related to
time constraints and partial resource sharing. Finding other
technologies for resolving such complex conflicts, and ef-
ficient verification techniques for verifying the consistency
of complex policy composition are yet challenging issues
for future work.
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